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Message
re: NJ challenging EO to end birth right citizenship
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:20 pm to SammyTiger
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:20 pm to SammyTiger
quote:Well, we are supposed to kick them out right? So yes. Temporarily.
are people here illegally here temporarily if they don’t intend to leave?
0
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:20 pm to ell_13
quote:
Then how is this currently applied to diplomats and no one else intent isn’t relevant?
You don't need legislative intent to understand the text includes diplomats.
quote:
The real object of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, in qualifying the words 'all persons born in the United States' by the addition 'and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases,—children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state,—both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law, from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 1, 18b; Cockb. Nat. 7; Dicey, Confl. Laws, 177; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99, 155; 2 Kent, Comm. 39, 42.
quote:
In the great case of The Exchange (1812) 7 Cranch. 116, the grounds upon which foreign ministers are, and other aliens are not, exempt from the jurisdiction of this country, were set forth by Chief Justc e Marshall in a clear and powerful train of reasoning, of which it will be sufficient, for our present purpose, to give little more than the outlines. The opinion did not touch upon the anomalous case of the Indian tribes, the true relation of which to the United States was not directly brought before this court until some years afterwards, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) 5 Pet. 1; nor upon the case of a suspension of the sovereignty of the United States over part of their territory by reason of a hostile occupation, such as was also afterwards presented in U. S. v. Rice, above cited. But in all other respects it covered the whole question of what persons within the territory of the United States are subject to the jurisdiction thereof.
68
The chief justice first laid down the general principle: 'The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case, it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction; but, if understood, not less obligatory.' 7 Cranch, 136.
69
He then stated, and supported by argument and illustration, the propositions that 'this full and absolute territorial jurisdiction, being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power,' has 'given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation,' the first of which is the exemption from arrest or detention of the person of a foreign sovereign entering its territory with its license, because 'a foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his dignity and the dignity of his nation'; 'a second case, standing on the same principles with the first, is the immunity which all civilized nations allow to foreign ministers'; 'a third case, in which a sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction, is where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions'; and, in conclusion, that 'a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign, with whom the government of the United States is at peace, and having entered an American port open for her reception, on the terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a friendly power, must be considered as having come into the American territory, under an implied promise that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.' 7 Cranch, 137-139, 147.
70
As to the immunity of a foreign minister, he said: 'Whatever may be the principle on which this immunity is established, whether we consider him as in the place of the sovereign he represents, or by a political fiction suppose him to be extraterritorial, and therefore, in point of law, not within the jurisdiction of the sovereign at whose court he resides, still the immunity itself is granted by the governing power of the nation to which the minister is deputed. This fiction of exterritoriality could not be erected and supported against the will of the sovereign of the territory. He is supposed to assent to it.' 'The assent of the sovereign to the very important and extensive exemptions from territorial jurisdiction, which are admitted to attach to foreign ministers, is implied from h e considerations that, without such exemption, every sovereign would hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad. His minister would owe temporary and local allegiance to a foreign prince, and would be less competent to the objects of his mission. A sovereign committing the interests of his nation with a foreign power to the care of a person whom he has selected for that purpose cannot intend to subject his minister in any degree to that power; and therefore a consent to receive him implies a consent that he shall possess those privileges which his principal intended he should retain,—privileges which are essential to the dignity of his sovereign, and to the duties he is bound to perform.' 7 Cranch, 138, 139.
71
The reasons for not allowing to other aliens exemption 'from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found' were stated as follows: 'When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately with the inhabitants of that other, or when merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. Nor can the foreign sovereign have any motive for wishing such exemption. His subjects thus passing into foreign countries are not employed by him, nor are they engaged in national pursuits. Consequently, there are powerful motives for not exempting persons of this description from the jurisdiction of the country in which they are found, and no one motive for requiring it. The implied license, therefore, under which they enter, can never be construed to grant such exemption.' 7 Cranch, 144.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:20 pm to SammyTiger
quote:Yet it is only still applied to one of these 3 groups.
the idea that they have an allegiance to a foreign sovereign relies heavily on them wanting to still be citizens of that country. something Tourists, Diplomats, and Native american have in common.
This post was edited on 1/23/25 at 10:22 pm
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:22 pm to SlowFlowPro
Why is something from 1812 relevant here?
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:24 pm to Vacherie Saint
quote:
Post-revolutionary migration was always legally sanctioned and controlled at the state or territorial level.
Cool. We're discussing federal policy, not state-based policy prior to the 14A.
There wasn't a comprehensive federal policy of this nature until the 1920s.
Hell, the first federal law, I believe was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
Funny enough, Wong Kim Ark covers that, too.
quote:
The acts of congress, known as the 'Chinese Exclusion Acts,' the earliest of which was passed some 14 years after the adoption of the constitutional amendment, cannot control its meaning, or impair its effect, but must be construed and executed in subordination to its provisions. Ad the right of the United States, as exercised by and under those acts, to exclude or to expel from the country persons of the Chinese race, born in China, and continuing to be subjects of the emperor of China, though having acquired a commercial domicile in the United States, has been upheld by this court, for reasons applicable to all aliens alike, and inapplicable to citizens, of whatever race or color. Chae Chan Ping v. U. S., 130 U. S. 581, 9 Sup. Ct. 623; Nishimura Ekiu v. U. S., 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. 336; Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016; Lem Moon Sing v. U. S., 158 U. S. 538, 15 Sup. Ct. 967; Wong Wing v. U. S., 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct. 977.
107
In Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., the right of the United States to expel such Chinese persons was placed upon the grounds that the right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, is an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence, and its welfare; that the power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law of the constitution, to intervene; that the power to exclude and the power to expel aliens rests upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the same power; and therefore that the power of congress to expel, like the power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or congress may call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien's right to be in the country has been made by congress to depend. 149 U. S. 711, 713, 714, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016.
108
In Lem Moon Sing v. U. S., the same principles were reaffirmed, and were applied to a Chinses person, born in China, who had acquired a commercial domicile in the United States, and who, having voluntarily left the country on a temporary visit to China, and with the intention of returning to and continuing his residence in this country, claimed the right under a statute or treaty to re-enter it; and the distinction between the right of an alien to the protection of the constitution and laws of the United States for his person and property while within the jurisdiction thereof, and his claim of a right to re-enter the United States after a visit to his native land, was expressed by the court as follows: 'He is none the less an alien, because of his having a commercial domicile in this country. While he lawfully remains here, he is entitled to the benefit of the guaranties of life, liberty, and property, secured by the constitution to all persons, of whatever race, within the jurisdiction of the United States. His personal rights when he is in this country, and such of his property as is here during his absence, are as fully protected by the supreme law of the land as if he were a native or naturalized citizen of the United States. But when he has voluntarily gone from the country, and is beyond its jurisdiction, being an alien, he cannot re-enter the United States in violation of the will of the government as expressed in enactments of the law-making power.' 158 U. S. 547, 548, 15 Sup. Ct. 971.
109
It is true that Chinese persons born in China cannot be naturalized, like other aliens, by proceedings under the naturalization laws. But this is for want of any statute or treaty authorizing or permitting such naturalization, as will appear by tracing the history of the statutes, treaties, and decisions upon that subject, always bearing in mind that statutes enacted by congress,a § well as treaties made by the president and senate, must yield to the paramount and supreme law of the constitution.
quote:
But the issue isn’t necessarily who is here illegally, but what constitutes citizenship.
He argued the citizenship was denied solely because the parents were not here legally.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:25 pm to SlowFlowPro
quote:
I'm making the textualist argument. Legislative intent is irrelevant
Earlier, you argued that textualism and original intent were had in glove.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:27 pm to ell_13
quote:
Why is something from 1812 relevant here?
This is what I want to know and why I asked, “How do recognized hostile nations and other US laws like defrauding the govt and illegal entry play a part in this? Honestly asking thoughts on how factors like this will play into the decision” but nobody replied.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:27 pm to ell_13
quote:
Why is something from 1812 relevant here?
You asked
quote:
Then how is this currently applied to diplomats and no one else if intent isn’t relevant?
In response to me saying I don't think legislative intent is relevant.
I showed you how this ruling/definition can apply to diplomats without looking at anything associated with the passage of the 14A, as the concept existed for a long time prior (why 1812 is important, as it pre-dates the Amendment by 50+ years).
So that answers how this ruling applies to diplomats while ignoring the legislative intent of the formation of the 14A
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:29 pm to Vacherie Saint
quote:
Earlier, you argued that textualism and original intent were had in glove.
You're conflating legislative intent with original intent.
Originalism has its uses, but it also rejects analyzing legislative intent.
quote:
he greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.
-Scalia
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:30 pm to SlowFlowPro
quote:
Cool. We're discussing federal policy, not state-based policy prior to the 14A
You claimed “here illegally” wasnt a thing prior the 14th, back when federalism was more of a thing. You were WONG. We’ll consider the goal posts moved.
quote:
Wong Kim Ark covers that, too.
How many fricking times do we need to cover this?
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:31 pm to SlowFlowPro
After reading that, it just tells me that the US can remove non-citizens as it feels necessary. It doesn’t mention those people’s children.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:31 pm to momentoftruth87
quote:
“How do recognized hostile nations and other US laws like defrauding the govt and illegal entry play a part in this? Honestly asking thoughts on how factors like this will play into the decision” but nobody replied.
That depends on if the court follows precedent (Wong Kim Ark) or creates an entirely new ruling/precedent.
If they create a new ruling/precedent, we won't know how to answer your question until they release the ruling.
Under Wong Kim Ark, the question is if the person falls under the 2 exceptions. Anything else is discussing another legal issue/question.
So, illegal entry, for example, is part of our immigration system and isn't specifically about citizenship.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:32 pm to SlowFlowPro
quote:
You're adding a layer of analysis on top of these exceptions that the court never did ("legal presence"),
No, I’m not.
Directly from the opinion:
"during all the time of their said residence in the United States, as domiciled residents therein".[128]
A domiciled resident is implicitly a legal resident; but not vice versa.
Your leaning on WKA here is incorrect and, I’m beginning to think intentionally, misleading.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:32 pm to ell_13
quote:
it just tells me that the US can remove non-citizens as it feels necessary.
Nobody is debating that point.
The question is if the children of those who can be removed born on US soil are citizens.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:34 pm to Vacherie Saint
quote:
You claimed “here illegally” wasnt a thing prior the 14th
Yes within the context of the discussion (federal law)
The 13-15th Amendments, especially the 14th changed the nature of the relationship between the states and federal government.
quote:
back when federalism was more of a thing. Y
It was a lot more of a thing when the 12th Amendment was the final one.
quote:
How many fricking times do we need to cover this?
I'm only telling you what the law is
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:35 pm to Dandy Chiggins
quote:
A domiciled resident is implicitly
Proved my point
quote:
Your leaning on WKA here is incorrect and, I’m beginning to think intentionally, misleading.
The irony
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:35 pm to SlowFlowPro
quote:Providing case law from 1812 only proves that the originators of the 14A had something specific in mind when writing it… in other words… a specific intent. Legislative intent even…
So that answers how this ruling applies to diplomats while ignoring the legislative intent of the formation of the 14A
You played yourself.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:36 pm to ell_13
quote:
Providing case law from 1812 only proves that the originators of the 14A had something specific in mind when writing it
It does not
quote:
in other words… a specific intent. Legislative intent even…
You can rely on this. Scalia and Clarence Thomas laugh at you doing so.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:36 pm to SlowFlowPro
quote:That’s what I said. It doesn’t mention them. And it’s a legitimate question right? That’s what we are discussing. That’s why there is an EO. What’s your point?
The question is if the children of those who can be removed born on US soil are citizens.
Posted on 1/23/25 at 10:36 pm to SlowFlowPro
quote:
So, illegal entry, for example, is part of our immigration system and isn't specifically about citizenship.
Illegal entry is causing citizenship so I don’t understand how it’s not about it. If they weren’t here it wouldn’t be a debate and per the law they shouldn’t be here.
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