Page 1 is already full of good answers as I start to type this. I will try to add a different perspective.

Consider what sort of things are "classified"...

In general, it's going to be information about operations and movements (troops or intel related), about places (situational/temporary ops related, permanent bases, restricted access areas (like SCIFs-- as mentioned by another poster)), about assets (people and equipment), and perhaps--broadly-- some internal intel related activities within the government-- whether related to domestic or foreign activity... This should cover most bases.

Beyond the categories above, you can also subdivide information from the perspective of organization/silos: is it military, paramilitary, proactive intel field ops, passive intel gathering ops, other specialty programs (maybe UFO or repressed materials, whatever that might mean).

Once you understand the above, it becomes easier to understand the access angle and how less people have access as you go up the chain of command... the less number of people know, the less the possibility of leaks. And the people at the top are vetted more thoroughly for trustworthiness.

In the military, for instance, there's information flowing into the admin office (and separate intel office if applicable) of every organization (battalion/platoon, squadron, carrier group, etc.) That info will always have a designation... to my memory, unless it's changed: unclassified, confidential, secret, & top secret.

- Unclassified: should be obvious... events that have zero operational value and command doesn't mind if civilians know it and may even prefer wide distribution of info if there's a PR angle.

- Confidential: I honestly don't remember... perhaps it's something like a training exercise where everyone in your unit knows, but you should avoid talking about it to civilians or even other groups. As long as you passed whatever background check to be an enlisted man in that group, you have access.

- Secret: In my experience, this type information includes sensitive troop movements that aren't necessarily clandestine, but that command doesn't want advertised for the safety of the troops. Of course, there are likely many other categories of info that fall into this category. By default, all officers have secret clearances. As a rule, officers usually have more stringent qualifications/requirements than enlisted men, and are therefore generally entrusted to know more in order to carry out the mission and with hope they'll be less inclined to get stupid drunk at a bar and disclose info. Importantly, though, certain enlisted men with intel related billets/MOS's, or who have operational specialties and/or have involvement in planned ops, may have higher clearances than officers in general.

-Top Secret: This is moving beyond my experience. It includes a lot of special ops work where you don't want the mess hall personnel, much less friends, family or acquaintances to have a clue of your plans. Something like the bin Laden operation would have at least been top secret-- if not some more specialized category. If secret info deserves modest certainty that people are responsible and don't have skeletons that might compromise them, top secret clearances are the level where heavy background checks come into play.

There will be a parallel as you move from the military to the intel community or to contractors like Blackwater, Raytheon, etc... lower level employees can see unclassified info, but as you move to confidential, secret, top secret and whatever higher designations, access is increasingly restricted based on background checks, need to know, expertise, and possibly other factors.

The current system incentives high level military and intel personnel who keep/maintain their clearances, giving them entree to a more lucrative, private, second career in the private sector / contractor side. I don't quite know the mechanisms of maintenance of clearances for former military/intel officials, but, in summary, maintaining access to info and connections = inside track for funding and influence with huge projects. These people parlay their access and expertise into permanent or consultative positions with contractors for big sums of money.

So, if you get your clearance revoked (vs your clearance expiring), it is generally indicative of a breach of trust (whether criminal or character related). And it's harder to get back, and may require further background investigations and possibly hearings. And if you lose it (as Brennan, Clapper, and others have), you've been cut off from your more lucrative second career.

In this particular case (all of the recent revocations), the ongoing comments by some of these guys (Brennan, etc) coupled with their overt disregard for standards for their own work product (as evidenced in some of the files Tulsi has released) provide basis to deem these people untrustworthy to maintain access to their clearances and knowledge of current intel operations. There is a risk they will either run to CNN with information or otherwise subvert it. Thus, revoking their clearances cuts them off from being able to do so, and limits their capacity to professionally / legally interact with any allies they might still have in the agencies. But, further, I suspect (I'm spitballing here) it may make it harder for them to continue any attempts to collude with one another about their past misdeeds through agency means in a way that is harder to pry into... they have less cover now.

The above should be mostly accurate as a starting point, though a lot more could be fleshed out at every level. And it seems that at least one or two people with more relevant experience than me have already chimed in... I would welcome any corrections they want to make to my commentary.

This post was edited on 8/19/25 at 11:04 pm

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Posted by I20goon

about 7mi down a dirt road

Member since Aug 2013

19829 posts

Posted on 8/20/25 at 12:08 am to FLTech

One of the biggest issues, other than general access (in any manner) to classified info, intel or condensed/briefing or not, is that someone who has clearance can no longer discuss classified topics with you.

You have to report that contact now since they don't have clearance. So if you are the leaker, they will nail you within days. Non-reporting would very likely break the espionage act.

In a manner of speaking, they lose plausible deniability. You can't accidentally (or incidentally) give classified info out because you weren't supposed to be discussing it at all anyway without running afoul of an oath, affidavit, and probably several laws.

That's likely the most important issue for all these talking heads that used to have clearance. They don't lose their sources; but their sources now are either so fearful they break off or otherwise have to report the discussion up the chain and out themselves.

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